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HABEAS CORPUS-STATE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE 
-EFFECT OF STATE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT ON AVAILABILITY 
OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEw-Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
Respondent Sykes was convicted of third degree murder after 
a jury trial in a Florida state court. Mter his arrest he had been 
given his Miranda warnings, but he waived his right to remain 
silent and made a confession which was introduced at his trial. 1 His 
attorney did not challenge the admission of the confession nor did 
the judge question its admissibility. Sykes was unsuccessful in his 
direct appeals in the Florida state courts. Only later, in a collateral 
attack in a state habeas corpus proceeding, did he raise the issue of 
the voluntariness of his confession. The state collateral attack was 
unsuccessful because under Florida's contemporaneous objection 
rule the procedural default barred relief. 2 Sykes was successful, 
however, in having his federal habeas corpus petition entertain~d 
in the United States District Court in Florida. The State of Florida 
appealed the federal district court's decision to entertain the peti­
tion. Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal 
defendant's failure to comply with a valid state procedural rule 
concerning the admission of a confession would bar federal habeas 
corpus review of his claim unless there is· a showing of cause for 
!. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.S. 72, 74 (1977). No written statement was of­
fered into evidence because Sykes refused to sign the statement once it was typed. 
ld. at 74 n.!. 
2. FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.190(i) (West 1967) provides: 

Motions to Suppress a Confession or Admissions Illegally Obtained. 

(1) Grounds. Upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the 
Court shall suppress any confession or admission obtained illegall~ from 
the defendant. 
(2) Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made prior to trial 
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware 
of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may enter­
tain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial. 
(3) Hearing. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact 
necessary to be decided in order to rule on the motion. 
Sykes' first argument was that this was not a contemporaneous objection rule and 
that it put the burden on the trial judge to raise on his own motion the question of 
the admissibility of any inculpatory statement. This interpretation was rejected by 
the Court because of the language of the statute and because of Florida case law 
interpreting the rule. 433 U.S. at 85-86. 
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the noncompliance and a showing of prejudice resulting from the 
procedural default. 3 
1. BACKGROUND 
The federal habeas corpus statute concerning state prisoners 
provides that federal courts shall entertain an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus, "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States."4 This statutory version of the common law writ of habeas 
corpus has given rise to four different questions which have often 
confronted the Supreme Court. 5 The first three questions concern, 
respectively, the type of federal claim that can be heard by a fed­
eral habeas court,6 the degree of deference to which a state court's 
3. 	 Id. at 86-87. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970). The earlier version of this statute was in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and was applicable only to prisoners detained by federal au­
thority. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 (1970». Its scope was greatly expanded in 1867, when Congress au­
thorized federal courts in all cases, including state cases, to grant the writ where a 
person was being held in violation of the Constitution of the United States. C. 
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 238 (3d ed. 1976). 
5. Three of these questions were not at issue in the Sykes case but they are 
relevant because they illustrate the Court's willingness to modify its views about the 
scope of habeas corpus even when the statutory language has remained unchanged. 
See 433 U.S. at 80-81 and notes 6-8 infra. 
6. Until the early twentieth century, the Court confined argument to the issue 
of whether the state court had the required jurisdiction to detain the prisoner. This 
jurisdictional viewpoint gradually changed. C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 239. In 
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), the Court held that if a court was under sway 
of mob rule, the proceedings, although formally proper, would be a mere mask de­
priving the court of jurisdiction. A prisoner convicted in such circumstances could 
then attack his conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458 (1938), an indigent federal prisoner's claim that he was denied the right 
to counsel at his trial was held to challenge the "power and authority" of the trial 
court. His claim, therefore, could be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding. [d. at 
463. 	In 1942, the Court finally abandoned its jurisdictional analysis stating: 
[Tlhe use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity 
of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment 
of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It 
extends also to those exceptional cases where the coiwiction has been in 
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is 
the only effective means of preserving his rights. 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (citations omitted). The writ had 
evolved over several decades from a mere checklist of jurisdictional requirements to 
a proceeding available whenever the state proceeding alIegedly violated a prisoner's 
federal constitutional rights. "Its province, shaped to guarantee the most fundamen­
tal of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial 
inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a person." Carafas v. LaVallee, 
391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
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resolution of the federal claim is entitled,7 and the extent to which 
a defendant must exhaust state remedies before resorting to federal 
habeas corpus. 8 In Sykes, the Court considered the fourth ques­
tion: what constitutes an independent and adequate state ground 
for a conviction that will bar otherwise cognizable federal issues 
from review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine originally 
developed as a jurisdictional limitation on direct Supreme Court 
review of state court decisions. 9 When a case is resolved on state 
substantive or procedural grounds so that the federal question is 
not reached,10 or when the federal question is decided along with a 
7. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the Supreme Court held that a fed­
eral judge is not barred by res judicata from deciding the federal question involved 
in a claim that had been rejected by a state court. ld. at 458. Justice Frankfurter, in a 
concurring opinion, stated that the federal judge could accept the determination of 
the facts by the state court unless there had been a "vital flaw" in the state factfind­
ing process. ld. at 506. He reasoned that the prior factfinding hearing would be more 
accurate than a new hearing because the recollections of those witnesses still availa­
ble would be affected by the passage of time. In 1963, in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293 (1963), the Court held that the federal court had the power to receive evidence 
and try facts anew on a habeas corpus petition. The majority summarized six cir­
cumstances in which a federal evidentiary hearing was mandatory: . 
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; 
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a 
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not 
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation 
of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that 
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact 
hearing. 
ld. at 313. The six circumstances were codified in somewhat different form in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) (added by Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105). 
8. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the petitioner claimed that his in­
dictment was based on an unconstitutional statute and sought habeas corpus relief in 
advance of the trial. The Court held that the federal courts had the power to decide 
the issue, but that the importance of maintaining good relations among the state 
courts and the federal court system weighed against taking up the matter until it had 
been considered in the state trial. ld. at 251. See also Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 
(1944); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 
(1907). The requirement of exhaustion of state remedies is codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b) & (c) (1970), which states that an application for a writ will not be granted 
if the prisoner has a state-provided right to raise the issue by any available proce­
dure. An application for direct review to the Supreme Court was initially required as 
well, Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), but this requirement was overruled by the 
Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963). 
9. The origin of the doctrine is found in the statutory construction of 2!,\ U.S.c. 
§ 1257 (1970), defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases 
decided in state courts. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1340 (1961). 
10. In one case, for example, a contract was held by a state court to have an 
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nonfederal claim which is sufficient to support the judgment inde­
pendently, there is no appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
of the United States. ll A decision on the federal question by the 
Supreme Court would not affect the outcome of the case and would 
constitute an advisory opinion.12 A decision on the nonfederal 
question would unduly infringe on the principles of federalism. 13 
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine eventu­
ally reached the habeas corpus area. 14 In that context, however, 
reliance on the doctrine by. the Supreme Court depended on 
whether the state law grounds were substantive or procedural. 
When the state law grounds for a conviction were substantive and 
were the only issues raised or were dispositive of the case, it was 
accepted. that no federal habeas corpus review would be avail­
able. 15 The law has been unclear, however, when federal claims 
could have been dispositive of the case in state court but were not 
heard because they were not presented in accordance with state 
procedural rules. Whether such a procedural default was an inde~ 
pendent and adequate state law ground to bar federal habeas. cor­
pus review is the subject of the Sykes case, which represents the 
Court's most recent attempt to deal with this difficult issue. 
Earlier decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court's varied ap­
proach to the treatment of st~te court procedural defaults. In 1953, 
in Daniels v. Alien,16 the defendant's lawyer filed an appeal with 
the state supreme court one day after the filing deadline. The state 
appellate court refused to hear the case. The Supreme Court held 
invalid arbitration clause which was not severable from the contract, so that the 
whole contract was invalid. The determination of non-severability made it unneces­
sary for the state court to decide whether the contract violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. The determination of the nonfederal question resolved the case. The Supreme 
Court would thus have no jurisdiction to review the federal question involved in 
such a decision. Fox Film Corp, v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 211 (1935). 
11. There are times when both state and federal questions are decided but it is 
unclear on which ground the state court has rested its decision. In such cases, the 
decision will not be reviewable if the state ground is an independent and adequate 
ground for the decision. Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1872). If the 
state ground does not have fair and substantial factual support, then the Supreme 
Court will exercise jurisdiction and review the case. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449, 455 (1958). . 
12. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-30 (1963). See also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 
117, 126 (1945). 
13. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875). 
14. See Irvin v. DQwd, 359 U.S. 394, 407c18 (1959) (dissenting opinions). 
15. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Durky v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 
277 (1956); Meeks v. Lainson, 236 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1956). 
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (decided sub 110m. Brown v. Allen). 
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that federal habeas relief was not available to the defendant. The 
Court reasoned that failure to perfect. an appeal according to 
reasonable state procedural rules· would bar collateral attack 
through federal habeas corpus because the state decision rested on 
independent and adequate state law grounds. 17 
In 1963, however, in a sweeping opinion by Justice Brennan, 
the Court overruled Daniels in Fay v. Noia. 18 In, Noia, the defen­
dant had personally decided not to directly appeal his conviction 'of 
murder fearing that if he were successful in his appeal a second 
trial could result in the death penalty. His two codefendants ap­
pealed and lost. Fourteen years later, the codefendants were re­
leased on federal habeas corpus writs because of a finding that their 
confessions had been coerced. Noia then sought federal habeas 
corpus relief. The state argued that Noia's petition should not be 
entertained because of his earlier failure to directly appeal his con­
viction and thus exhaust his state remedies at that time. 19 The 
Court disagreed, stating that while a procedural default such as the 
failure to make a timely appeal constituted an independent and 
adequate state law ground that would bar direct review by the 
Supreme Court, such a procedural default would not bar federal 
habeas corpus review. 20 
Under Noia, a procedural default in state court would not bar 
a federal court from providing habeas corpus relief unless there had 
been a deliberate by-pass of state procedural rules. A federal dis­
trict judge would be required to entertain a habeas corpus petition, 
but there would be a "limited discretion" in the federal judge to 
'''deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the or­
derly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his 
state court remedies. "21 
The determination of whether there had been a deliberate 
by-pass of state procedural rules under Noia was governed by the 
traditional waiver test set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst. 22 The Zerbst 
Court defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or aban­
17. Id. at 458. 
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
19. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
20. "[T]he doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute 
an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review 
is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal 
habeas statute." 372 U.S. at 399. 
21. Id. at 438. 
22. 304 U5. 458 (1938). 
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donment of a known right or privilege. "23 The N oia Court used 
this personal waiver standard in determining that the defendant's 
decision not to appeal was not such an intentional relinquishment 
as to amount to a "deliberate by-pass."24 The Court in Noia noted 
that the defendant had a "grisly choice" between his life sentence 
or pursuit of an appeal which could have resulted in the death 
penalty at a second trial and ruled that there had been no deliber­
ate by-pass of the state system in order to have the claim heard for 
the first time on the federal leveL 25 
II. THE SYKES CASE 
In Sykes, the Court rejected the deliberate by-pass standard 
established in Noia and replaced it with a cause and prejudice 
standard. This standard was meant to be narrower than the Noia 
standard, thus decreasing the availability of federal habeas corpus 
relief.26 A default caused by a deliberate by-pass of state proce­
dures and a default caused by an inadvertent attorney failure to 
abide by state procedures must both meet the cause and prejudice 
standard of Sykes before federal habeas corpus review will be 
granted. 
In Sykes, the Court first determined that the attorney's pro­
cedural default in not challenging the use of the confession at trial 
forfeited the right to a hearing on this issue at the trial level. 27 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, then examined whether 
the procedural default would constitute an independent and ade­
23. [d. at 464. In the Zerbst case, this standard was to be applied on remand by 
the district court to determine whether the accused had competently and intelli­
gently waived his right to counsel. 
24. 372 U.S. at 399. 
25. [d. at 440. 
26. "We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of 
the 'cause' and 'prejudice' standard, and note here only that it is narrower than the 
standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, ...." 433 U.S. at 87. 
27. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Court invalidated a New York 
procedure which, rather than providing a hearing on the voluntariness of a confes­
sion, allowed the jury to decide the issue. Justice Rehnquist, in Sykes, stated that 
Jackson was not to be read as requiring a hearing when the defendant has not ob­
jected to the admission of his confession. 433 U.S. at 86. Rather, it was to be read as 
requiring a hearing on the issue only when the confession has been challenged. The 
Court reasoned that a defendant has a " 'right at some stage in the proceedings to 
object to the use of the conf.ession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determi­
nation on the issue of voluntariness... .' " [d. (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 
376-77) (emphasis added by the Court). As Sykes' attorney had not challenged the use 
of the confession, a hearing on its voluntariness was not constitutionally required. 433 
U.S. at 86. 
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quate state law ground that would bar federal habeas corpus review. 
He noted that under Fay v. Noia, such a procedural default would 
not bar federal habeas corpus relief unless it was shown that the 
default was a deliberate by-pass of the state procedural system. 28 
However, he then cited two later decisions involving challenges to 
grand jury selection, Davis v. United States29 and Francis v. Hen­
derson,30 which he viewed as providing an alternative to the delib­
erate by-pass standard of Noia. 
In Davis, a federal prisoner's habeas corpus petition under the 
relevant habeas statute sought for the first time to challenge the 
makeup of the grand jury which indicted him. 31 Rule 12(b)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required that such a chal­
lenge to the grand jury be made in a motion before trial. 32 The 
rule further stated that failure to make objections to an issue would 
constitute a waiver thereof, but the court, for cause shown, can 
grant relief from the waiver. 33 The Davis Court held that this rule, 
"promulgated by this Court and, ... 'adopted' by Congress, gov­
erns by its terms the manner in which the claims of defects in the 
institution of criminal proceedings may be waived. . . . "34 The 
Court in Davis stated that this standard, derived from the Federal 
Rules rather than the Fay v. Noia concept of waiver, should apply 
not only to direct review of the criminal proceedings, but also to 
28. ld. at 87. 
29. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 

30. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). 

3l. 411 U.S. 233, 235 (1973). Federal prisoners are provided relief through 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, which represents the counterpart to the remedy afforded state pris­
oners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
32. The Federal Rule applicable at the time stated in pertinent part: 
(b) The Motion Raising Defenses and Objections. 
(2) Defenses and Objections Which Must Be Raised. 
Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecu­
tion or in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show juris­
diction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised only by motion 
before trial. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then 
available to the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection 
as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause 
shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of 
the indictment of information to charge an offense shall be noticed by the 
court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). (Rule 12 was amended in 1975 and 12(b)(2) was recodified 
in the new sections, 12(b) and 12(f). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Act of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975)). 
33. ld. 
34. 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973). 
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collateral proceedings involving federal habeas corpus petitions of 
federal prisoners. 35 The Davis Court concluded that the claim 
should be barred from habeas corpus as it would be from a hearing 
on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance 
and a showing of actual prejudice resulting from the procedural 
default. 36 The Court ignored the Noia decision, stating that the 
congressional purpose behind rule 12(b)(2), which governed waiver 
during the criminal proceedings, would be perversely negated if 
an entirely different and much more liberal requirement of waiver 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings was to be used. 37 
In 1976, in Francis v. Henderson,38 the rule of Davis was 
applied in the case of a state prisoner attempting to challenge the 
grand jury composition despite a state procedural requirement that 
such challenges be raised before trial. The Court in Francis noted 
that the federal courts had the power· to entertain such a habeas 
corpus petition but that it would not do so, based on "considera~ 
tions of comity and concerns for orderly administration of criminal 
justice. "39 The Francis Court ruled that the cause and prejudice 
standard derived from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
should be applied to the state prisoner's federal habeas petition as 
35. Id. at 242. 
36. Id. The Davis Court derived the prejudice element from Shotwell Mfg. Co. 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963), which stated that where "objection to the jury 
selection has not been timely raised under 12(b)(2), it is entirely proper to take ab­
sence of prejudice into account in determining whether a sufficient showing has 
been made to warrant relief from the effect of that Rule:' Davis v. United States, 411 
U.S. 233, 244 (1973) (quoting Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 363). 
The district court in the Davis case relied upon the element of prejudice and this 
was accepted by the Supreme Court. 411 U.S. at 244. 
37. Id. at 242. The Noia concept of waiver in federal habeas corpus was applied 
to federal prisoners in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 222 (1969). See also 
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). The Davis Court explained that in 
Kaufman it had rejected a claim that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limited the availability of fed­
eral habeas corpus relief when there was a waiver due to failure to assert a claim on 
appeal. 411 U.S. at 240. The Court noted, however, that the claim of the government 
in Davis was that because of a waiver rule 12(b)(2), and not § 2255, limited the avail­
ability of federal habeas corpus proceedings. The government also argued that rule 
12(b)(2) governed waiver of grand jury composition in the context of the criminal pro­
ceedings themselves. The Court concluded that rule 12(b)(2) governed not only dur­
ing the criminal proceedings, but also later at the habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 242. 
As to the burden on federal courts using a more liberal standard of waiver for habeas 
corpus review, see note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
38. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). 
39. Id. at 539 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). This was the only men­
tion of Noia in the majority opinion. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Francis, chal­
lenged the Court to perform its "institutional duty" to overrule Fay v. Noia if that 
was what it intended. 425 U.S. at 547. 
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"[t]here is no reason to give greater preclusive effect to pro­
cedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by 
state defendants. "40 
In these two decisions, the Sykes Court discovered an alterna­
tive analysis which it could use to limit the apparently all-inclusive 
deliberate by-pass standard of Noia. In Davis, the Court ignored 
Noia, relying instead on a questionable interpretation of congres­
sional intent behind the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 41 In 
Francis, the Court applied the cause and prejudice standard to 
state prisoners to bar review of a challenge to the makeup of a 
grand jury.42 The Sykes Court then extended the rule of Francis v. 
Henderson to a waived objection to the admission of a confession at 
trial. 43 The Sykes Court thus identified this type of procedural de­
fault as an independent and adequate state ground that would bar 
federal habeas corpus review as well as direct federal review. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In analyzing Wainwright v. Sykes, it is important to note the 
dramatic increase in federal habeas corpus petitions since Noia. 44 
The effect of this increase may be overemphasized, however, as 
many of the petitions do not require much time. 45 The volume of 
applications can lead to the type of comment made by Justice 
Jackson: "He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to 
end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. "46 
40. [d. at 542 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969)). 
41. See notes 48-54 infra and accompanying text. 
42. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
43. 433 U.S. at 87. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text. 
44. Petitions for habeas corpus filed by state prisoners jumped from 1,020 in 
1961 to 7,949 in 1972. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 n.14 (1973). See 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 11-5, 22, 28-32 (1972). 
45. In 1968, over 6,300 petitions were filed in federal district courts by 
state prisoners. This was an increase of 286 percent in just five years. Yet it 
is all too easy to overstate the strain that an expanded habeas jurisdiction 
and expanded federal constitutional rights put on the judicial system. Most 
of the petitions were quickly dismissed: less than 500 reached the hearing 
stage, and most of those hearings lasted less than one day. Nor was the bur­
den on the states staggering; many petitions do not even require a response; 
less than ten percent of the state convictions attacked had to be defended in 
a hearing, and so few prisoners were released that the burden of retrial must 
be small. 
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1041 
(1970) (footnotes omitted). 
46. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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But as one commentator has noted, "it is not a needle we are 
looking for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human 
being. "47 
In Davis, 48 the Court had already started its retreat from the 
broad accessibility of federal courts through habeas corpus petitions 
represented in the approach of Fay v. Noia. 49 The Court stated that 
rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indicated 
congressional intent to narrow such access. 50 Congressional intent, 
however, is often difficult to ascertain accurately. Justice Brennan, 
dissenting in Sykes, stated that: 
[s]ince at least Brown v. Allen, it has been recognized that the 
"fair effect [of] the habeas corpus jurisdiction as enacted by 
Congress" entitles a state prisoner to such federal review. . . . 
While some of my Brethren may feel uncomfortable with this 
congressional choice of policy, ... the Legislative Branch none­
theless remains entirely free to determine that the constitutional 
rights of an individual subject to state custody, . . . are best 
preserved by "interpos[ing] the federal courts between the States 
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights .... "51 
Justice Brennan also noted that alternative measures were available 
to Congress when it made its policy choices regarding federal de­
termination of constitutional rights in the habeas corpus area, 52 
such as removing all state criminal cases to the federal courts 
whenever constitutional defenses were raised. 53 He observed that 
despite the availability of these· alternatives, "liberal post-trial fed­
eral review is the redress that Congress ultimately chose to allow 
and the consequences of a state procedural default should be 
evaluated in conformance with this policy choice. "54 Notwithstand­
ing Justice Brennan's comments, the Supreme Court, in decisions 
47. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1,25 
(1956). A 1966 study of this burden on federal courts concluded that: "While the 
burden of state-prisoner habeas corpus petitions on the federal courts is increasing, it 
has not yet reached alarming proportions, and presently represents only a small per­
centage of the courts' total work load." 52 VA. L. REV. 486, 506 (1966). See also 
Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321, 
372 (1973). 
48. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
49. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
50. 411 U.S. at 241. 
51. 433 U.S. at 105-06 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953); 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)). 
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970); note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
53. 433 U.S. at 106-07. 
54. Id. 
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subsequent to Davis, continued to reduce the number of situations 
in which state prisoners would have access to the federal habeas 
corpus remedy. 
In Stone v. Powell,55 the Court held that where a state has 
provided a full and fair hearing of a fourth amendment claim, a 
state prisoner would not be granted federal habeas corpus review. 
The rationale given was that the deterrent purpose of the ex­
clusionary rule would not be served by providing habeas corpus 
relief to state prisoners and the harm to society would be great if 
the exclusionary rule were to be applied. 56 Justice Brennan, dis­
senting in Powell, feared that the decision contained the seeds for 
the exclusion of a variety of constitutional rights-perhaps those 
that were not thought to be "guilt related. "57 
Unlike Stone v. Powell, which denied a federal hearing to a 
state prisoner who had had a full hearing to challenge the state's 
conduct at the state level, Wainwright v. Sykes denied a federal 
hearing to a state prisoner who did not have a hearing at the state 
level. Under Powell, federal habeas relief is only barred when the 
state court has investigated the state government's conduct in a 
full and fair hearing. In Sykes, there was no hearing on the challenge 
to the state's conduct at any level, state or federal. Both decisions 
curtail the proper role of the federal courts of "interpos[ing] the 
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians 6f 
the people's federal rights.. "58 
Over Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent, the Sykes Court has 
55. 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976). 
56. The Powell Court stated that exclusion at the trial level serves to discourage 
police conduct that violates the fourth amendment. The Court noted, however, that 
the additional deterrent effect of allowing the exclusionary rule to operate at federal 
habeas corpus review when there was a prior hearing on the matter would be small 
in relation to the consequences. [d. at 493. As to the consequences of applying the 
exclusionary rule in habeas proceedings, the Court stated that it "deflects the 
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty" and that "[t]he disparity in particular 
cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a 
guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality 
that is essential to the concept of justice." [d. at 490 (footnotes omitted). 
57. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Powell, stated that: 

[T]he groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal ha­

beas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, 

then at least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment, self­

incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification proce­

dures-that this Court later decides are not "guilt related." 

428 U.S. 465, 517-18 (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan reiterated this view in 
Sykes. 433 U.S. at 110. 
58. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
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closed the federal door on many state prisoners who have lost their 
right to present federal claims at the state level due to procedural 
defaults. Under the Noia standard of review the premise was that a 
federal court would be required to entertain the habeas corpus pe­
tition unless a ,deliberate by-pass of state procedures was found. 
Under Sykes, however, there will be no hearing unless the defen­
dant can satisfY the cause and prejudice standard. This shift in em­
phasis will make the task of federal habeas petitioners more dif­
ficult even though they have always had the burden of proof in 
habeas corpus proceedings. 59 It can no longer be said, as it could 
after Noia, that "the interest in achieving finality in criminal pro­
ceedings is to be valued less highly than the interest in, assuring 
that no individual is deprived of life or liberty in violation of the 
Constitution. "60 
The desire for finality at the trial level has traditionally been 
compromised in the interest of achieving justice for the criminal 
defendant. The entire system of liberal post-trial relief rests on the 
assumption that at times the interest in finality in criminal proceed­
ings must give way to the belated correction of error through direct 
appeal and collateral review. 61 Collateral relief through habeas cor­
pus to remedy inadvertent procedural defaults should not be se­
verely restricted because of undue' deference to local procedure. 
Noia recognized that: 
[aJ man under conviction for. crime has an obvious inducement to 
do his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake 
his all on the outcome of a federal habeas prqceeding which, in 
many respects, may be less advantageous to him than a state 
59. Eagles v. United States ex rei. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304,314 (1946); Walker v. 
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938). 
60. Pollak, The Supreme Court 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 140 (1963) 
(footnote omitted). 
61. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sykes, stated that: 
The federal criminal system, to take one example, expressly disapproves of 
interlocutory review in the generality of .cases even though such a policy 
would foster finality by permitting the a'uthoritative resolution of all legal 
and constitutional issues prior to the convening of the "main event." ... 
Instead, it relies on ,th'e belated correction of error, through appeal and col­
lateral review, to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal sanction. 
Indeed, the very existence of the well-established right collaterally to 
reopen issues previously litigated before the state courts, ... represents a 
congressional policy choice that is inconsistent with notions of strict 
finality-and probably more so than authorizing the litigation of issues that, 
due to inadvertence, were never addressed to any court. 
433 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted). 
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court proceeding. . And if because of inadvertence or neglect 
he runs afoul of a state procedural requirement, and thereby for­
feits his state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as direct 
review thereof in this Court, those consequences should be suffi­
cient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly proce­
dure. 62 
The Court in Sykes emphasized the importance of maintaining 
the integrity of the state's procedural rules. The Court indicated its 
desire to have all parties view the criminal trial as the "main 
event," not a meaningless ritual which precedes the real adjudica­
tion of a defendant's claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 63 
Justice Rehnquist noted that, "[s]ociety's resources have been con­
centrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the 
limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innoceQce of one 
of its citizens. "64 The value of a state contemporaneous objection 
rule is that it forces a decision on an issue at the trial if an objec­
tion is raised. It also enables a better and more accurate record to 
be made because recollections are fresh and the trial judge is able 
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Justice Rehnquist, for 
the majority, stated that the Noia rule could be used to ignore 
state procedures: 
We think that the rule of Fay v. Noia, broadly stated, may 
encourage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers, who 
may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial 
court and intend to raise their constitutional claims in federal 
habeas corpus court if their initial gamble does not payoff. 65 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, answered this charge by outlining 
what would be involved in a "sandbagging" effort by defense coun­
sel under the Noia rule. First, the possibility of conviction would 
increase as evidence which might have been excluded is allowed in 
by the deliberate failure of the attorney to object. Second, as a 
result of the waiver, all direct review in the state court would be 
lost. Third, defense counsel would then have to deceive a federal 
habeas court and convince the federal judge that he did not delib­
erately by-pass the state procedures. Justice Brennan concluded 
that the belief that many lawyers were induced into the "sandbag­
ging" defense simply offended common sense. 66 The fear of 
62. 372 U.S. 391, 433 (1963) (citation omitted). 
63. 433 U.S. at 90. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 89. 
66. Id. at 103-04 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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"sandbagging," moreover, does not square with the Noia opinion. 
It was just this type of deliberate by-pass that Noia sought to 
prevent. 
Justice Rehnquist failed to recognize that there are other 
reasons, besides the unlikely "sandbagging" maneuver, why all the 
issues of a criminal trial may not be resolved at the "main event." 
One such situation occurs when an attorney inadvertently fails to 
object in order to preserve claims for appeal. A similar problem is 
raised when the state court uses an erroneous interpretation of 
constitutional law as the basis for its decision. When an attorney 
objects for appeal purposes, he saves the client's federal claims for 
direct review in both the state and federal systems. When an at­
torney inadvertently fails to object, the defendant forteits his right 
to direct review, leaving habeas corpus review as the last forum 
available. Therefore, courts should be careful to distinguish an at­
tomey's inadvertent failure to object from the situation in which 
the attorney chooses to forego raising a claim for tactical reasons. 
To deny habeas corpus relief because of an inadvertent procedural 
default would ignore the "primary responsibility" of the federal 
courts to "[preserve] federal rights and privileges, "67 and work 
undue hardship on the criminal defendant. The Sykes Court failed 
to make this distinction and chose simply to conclude that Sykes 
had failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard. 
It remains to be seen if the cause and prejudice standard of 
Sykes will maintain the Writ's great tradition as "the best and only 
sufficient defence of personal freedom"68 and "both the symbol and 
guardian of individual liberty. "69 The standard was intentionally left 
undefined by the Court. Because it is meant to be narrower than 
the N oia standard,70 the number of habeas corpus petitions enter­
tained by federal courts will decrease. The Court intended the 
Sykes standard to provide the leeway necessary to obtain review 
when a procedural default has occurred. Whether it will or not is 
an open question. The cause and prejudice standard was not clearly 
defined in the earlier decisions of Davis v. United States or Francis 
v. Henderson.71 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sykes, noted wryly 
that, "although some four years have passed since its introduction 
in Davis v. United States, . . . the only thing clear about the 
67. Id. at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
68. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). 
69. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968). 
70. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
71. See notes 29-40 supra and accompanying text. 
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Court's 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard is that it exhibits the nota­
ble tendency of keeping prisoners in jail without addressing their 
constitutional complaints. "72 
In failing to distinguish between a deliberate by-pass of state 
procedure and an inadvertent default, the Sykes Court has neces­
sarily rejected traditional notions of personal informed waiver by a 
criminal defendant in the trial context. The Noia Court defined the 
deliberate by-pass formula through the traditional waiver test of 
Johnson v. Zerbst which required an "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege."73 By rejecting the de­
liberate by-pass standard, the Sykes Court has also rejected this 
personal waiver test. In its place, the Court has suggested a system 
of procedural forfeitures, based not upon the client's informed de­
cisions but rather upon the attorney's procedural choices or mis­
takes. 74 
72. 433 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
73. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
74. See Lo~d v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Estelle, 556 
F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977). The 
personal infonned waiver test of Zerbst did not preclude attorneys from waiving the 
accused's rights. Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Partici­
pation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262 (1966). 
The rationales for this result, however, do not support the conclusion that inadvertent 
attorney action should be permitted to waive the client's rights. 
One traditional rationale for allowing the attorney to waive his or her client's 
rights rested upon notions of agency law. Id. at 1278-81. In Sykes, however, Justice 
Brennan observed that this rationale is inapposite in criminal proceedings: 
With respect to ordinary commercial matters, the common law established 
and recognized principal-agent relationships for the protection of innocent 
third parties who deal with the latter. In the context of a criminal trial, this 
analogy is not apt, for the State, primarily in control of the criminal process 
and responsible for qualifying and assigning attorneys to represent the ac­
cused, is not a wholly innocent bystander. Consequently, the dominant rela­
tionship of the trial counsel with respect to his client more recently has 
been 'found simply to inhere in "our legal system" or "our adversary sys­
tem." 
433 U.S. at 114 n.13 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
A second view justified attorney waiver as part of trial strategy and tactics de­
vised by the attorney, who was regarded as the manager of the defendant's case. See, 
e.g., Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73, 78 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965). 
However, inadvertent attorney waiver by hypothesis cannot be considered a tactical 
maneuver or part of trial strategy. 
The Supreme Court has on occasion limited the circumstances in which an at­
torney may waive his or her client's rights. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 
443, 451-52 (1965) (counsel may waive accused's rights at trial unless there are ex­
ceptional circumstances). When fundamental rights are involved, a personal waiver 
by the client is required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (fifth 
amendment rights); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (right to a jury 
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This suggested system of procedural forfeitures is contrary to 
the view that "courts indulge [in] every reasonable presumption 
against waiver"75 of fundamental rights and that the courts "do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. "76 While 
the concept of waiver is based on informed consent, the Sykes sys­
tem of forfeiture of rights fails to distinguish informed consent from 
the unknowing failure to assert rights at the appropriate time. Be­
cause the rights involved in the criminal process directly affect the 
defendant's life and liberty, this system should not be allowed to 
replace a system based on informed waiver of rights. 
If a system of waiver is to be retained, the Sykes focus on the 
attorney's actions rather than on the client's actions creates the 
need for a standard against which the nature of the attorney's 
waiver of his client's rights can be judged. The standard for deter­
mining whether a valid attorney waiver has occurred should be the 
same as that used in the past to judge the client's own actions: the 
Zerbst standard of intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege. 
A standard requiring that attorney waiver of client rights be 
informed may be too burdensome in the context of direct review in 
state and federal courts since, "the trial of a criminal defendant 
[should] not inevitably be followed by a trial of his attorney's per­
formance."77 Concern for the value of state procedures would re­
quire a less stringent standard for attorney waiver of claims in the 
context of direct appellate remedies. This would allow state con­
temporaneous objection rules to operate to cause a forfeiture of 
state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as direct review in 
the Supreme Court. Such a forfeiture should foster adherence to 
state procedural requirements. 78 However, a stringent informed 
waiver standard is appropriate in examining the attorney's actions 
in the context of a habeas proceeding because that forum is the 
defendant's last resort for any hearing. Access to the federal habeas 
trial). These cases illustrate situations in which the client must participate in the 
waiver decision. They do not support the conclusion that inadvertent attorney action 
should be viewed as an effective waiver of the client's rights. 
75. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (jury trial) (foot­
note omitted); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (jury trial). See also John­
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (right to counsel). 
76. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). 
See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (waiver of counsel is not to be 
presumed from a silent record). 
77. 433 U.S. at 114 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
78. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. 
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corpus' forum should not be cut off because of the attorney's inad­
vertence in causing the procedural default. This informed waiver 
standard should not unduly burden the federal habeas corpus 
system. 79 
It is unclear from the Sykes decision whether the cause and 
prejudice standard will be satisfied by a showing of inadvertent at­
torney waiver. If the proper measure used to judge a valid attorney 
waiver of client rights for habeas corpus purposes is the Zerbst in­
formed waiver standard, then only such a waiver by the attorney 
will serve to deny federal habeas corpus review to the client. Thus, 
a showing of inadvertent waiver by the attorney should be suffi­
cient to satisfY Sykes' two requirements of showing cause for the 
disregarding of state procedural rules and prejudice resulting from 
the default. 
The Sykes Court did not consider whether the attorney waiver 
in that case was inadvertent, finding simply that the cause and 
prejudice standard was not met. 80 It left to later decisions the task 
of defining that standard and its application to an inadvertent attor­
ney waiver. Therefore, in subsequent cases, the Court can reject 
the suggested system of forfeitures and return to a system of in­
formed waiver focusing not on the client's informed waiver, but 
rather on the attorney's knowing relinquishment of his client's 
rights to allow access to federal habeas corpus for inadvertent de­
faults. 
Justice Brennan strongly objected to the decision in Sykes be­
cause he assumed that the facts indicated an inadvertent waiver by 
the attorney. He attempted to retain the Zerbst standard as applied 
to the defendant's own actions, stating that the defendant should 
79. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. 
80. 433 U.S. at 91. Justice Brennan believed that it was because of simple error 
that Sykes' attorney failed to object to the admission of the confession. Id. at 105. 
Although the majority opinion did not reach this issue, see note 26 supra, it left the 
door open for a different rule in situations in which a defendant was faced with a 
"grisly choice" as in Naia: 
We have no occasion today to consider the Fay rule as applied to the facts 
there confronting the Court. Whether the Francis rule should preclude fed­
eral habeas review of claims not made in accordance with state procedure 
where the criminal defendant has surrendered, other than for reasons of tac­
tical advantage, the right to have all of his claims of trial error considered by 
a state appellate court, we leave for another day. 
433 U.S. at 88 n.12. In Naia, the defendant waived his right to appeal for fear of the 
possibility of the death sentence in a subsequent retrial. See note 16 supra. Since an 
inadvertent waiver, although not a waiver in the face of a "grisly choice," is nonethe­
less a waiver made other than for reasons of tactical advantage, a different rule could 
apply in that situation as well. 
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knowingly and intelligently participate with his lawyer where possi­
ble in the trial. 81 The requirement of personal participation by the 
accused where possible would be difficult to define. Justice Burger, 
concurring in Sykes, objected to this requirement reasoning that 
the Zerbst standard, which had been thought to govern the ac­
cused's waiver, was inappropriate as a standard for attorney waiver. 
Justice Burger concluded that this vague standard would be un­
manageable. 82 
The standard proposed by Justice Brennan would indeed be 
difficult to administer. It would require an inquiry into whether it 
was possible for the accused to consult with the attorney regarding 
each attorney waiver. A more workable approach would be to use 
the Zerbst standard as applied directly to attorneys to determine 
the quality of their waiver of client rights at the trial. The Zerbst 
standard would serve as a standard for attorney waiver of client 
rights as well as a standard for personal waiver by the client where 
personal waiver by the client is required. 83 Whether the attorney 
had an opportunity to consult with the accused in trial strategy 
would not be the issue. Rather, the Court would ask whether the 
attorney made a knowing waiver of his client's rights. The applica­
tion of the Zerbst standard in this way takes into account the diffi­
culty of consulting with the accused about every possible tactical 
maneuver in the trial. It accepts the reality that the "vast array of 
trial decisions, strategic, and tactica1"84 are for the attorney to 
make. The stress is not on personal participation by the accused 
but on the attorney's knowing waiver. In this way, the Zerbst stan­
dard, as applied directly to attorneys regardless of their consulta­
tion with the accused, becomes a workable definition for valid at­
torney waiver of client rights for purposes of federal habeas corpus 
review in the face of a procedural waiver at the state trial. 85 
81. 433 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 94. 
83. See note 74 supra. 
84. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976). 
85. Because the attorney can waive many of the accused's rights, a question 
must be raised as to how much knowledge is required of the attorney in order to 
make an effective waiver. Counsel need not know for certain that a valid objection to 
a substantive right exists. He must know simply that there is an arguable basis for 
such an objection. If he then decides not to object, it has been held that this consti­
tutes a valid waiver. Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20, 25-26 (9th Cir. 1966) (waiver 
found when an attorney who was not certain he had a valid ground to object to a 
certain fourth amendment claim decided not to object). See also Estelle v. Wil­
liams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). There, the attorney's failure to object when the defendant 
was dressed in prison garb at his trial was held to be a waiver. Id. at 512-13. The 
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It is especially important that an inadvertent attorney waiver 
not preclude habeas relief when illegal government conduct has 
procured the conviction. A conviction procured by unconstitutional 
means remains unconstitutional,86 and a rule forfeiting the defen­
dant's remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct 
that helped procure the conviction. 87 It must be remembered that 
the state, which initiates the prosecution, initially decides how the 
case is to be presented. It should not be allowed to benefit from 
illegal conduct and hope that procedural error on the part of de­
fense counsel will foreclose the chances of righting the wrong. 88 
As it is unclear whether a showing of inadvertent attorney 
waiver will satisfy the cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, an 
alternative method of gaining access to federal habeas corpus courts 
is desirable. That method might be found in a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel resting in part on counsel's inadvertent waiver 
of client rights. The Supreme Court has denounced the "denial of 
effective and substantia1"89 assistance of counsel and the appoint­
ment of counsel in a manner which precludes "the giving of effec­
tive aid. "90 The attorney in an inadvertent waiver situation should 
argue for a standard that defines the denial of effective representa­
tion as the failure to give representation that is "within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. "91 Such a 
standard would make ineffective assistance of counsel a viable 
claim. 92 
attorney did not object, believing that such an objection would have been futile. The 
applicable law, however, would have supported such an objection if it had been 
made. Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring). In both these cases, counsel was aware that 
an objection might have been made. They were not inadvertent waivers but waivers 
due to a conscious choice which later proved to be an error in judgment. 
86. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963). See also Grano, The Right to Coun­
sel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1229 (1970). 
87. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963). 
88. United States ex rei. Vanderhorst v. LaVallee, 285 F. Supp. 233,244 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1968). 
89. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
90. Id. at 71. 
91. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (standard used to evaluate 
attorney advice to defendant to assure that defendant's plea of guilty was voluntary). 
See also Toilette v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,266 (1973). 
92. The "mockery of justice" standard has been used in some cases dealing 
with ineffec~ive assistance of counsel. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 
1965). This standard, however, did not adequately protect the right of the accused to 
effective assistance of counsel. Relief was granted only, "when the trial was a farce, 
or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or 
the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The overriding conflict that is apparent in the line of cases 
leading to Sykes occurs between the desire for finality and the 
I 
need for justice in state criminal proceedings. In this balancing ef­
fort, Noia was decided in favor of the need for justice. Noia sought 
to remove "all procedural hurdles to the achievement of swift and 
imperative justice on habeas corpus . . . . "93 It emphasized that all 
or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation." Id. (citations omit­
ted). For cases denying relief under the mockery test, see: United States v. Currier, 
405 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1969); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969); 
Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 
Stahl, 393 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.),' cert. denied, 393 U.S. 879 (1968); Kienlen v. United 
States, 379 F.2d 20 (lOth Cir. 1967); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); United States ex rei. Darcy v. Handy, 203 
F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945). 
Modern tests for effective assistance of counsel require a certain level of compe­
tence from attorneys. These tests can be used as a basis for relief when the mockery 
of justice test would provide no relief. In United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 
510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), the state-appointed lawyer did not seek to postpone the 
start of the trial in order to investigate the role of a codefendant in the alleged crime. 
This failure to adequately prepare the case was held to be grossly incompetent pro­
fessional conduct. Id. at 640-41. The court broadened the mockery test in order to 
grant relief, requiring "legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of profes­
sional representation." Id. at 641. See also United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 
1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assis­
tance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate") (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis in original). ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, states 
that "[tlhe basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice 
is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate, with courage, devotion and to 
the utmost of his learning and ability and according to law." Id. § 1.1(b) (1971). 
Though these standards are not intended "as criteria for the judicial evaluation of the 
effectiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a conviction; they mayor may 
not be relevant in such judicial evaluation . . . depending upon all the circum­
stances." Id. § 1.1(f). 
In Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977), a case decided after the 
Sykes decision and involving a procedural default, counsel for the defendant ob­
jected to the introduction of evidence of prior uncounselled convictions which were 
used for purposes of the Texas Sentence Enhancement Statute. Id. at 507. His objec­
tions, however, were not based on grounds that were supportable despite the exis­
tence of such grounds. Id. at 510. Counsel consequently violated the state contem­
poraneous objection rule which required an objection based on the very ground on 
which later relief is sought. Id. at 507. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the lower district court's refusal to entertain the habeas petition and remanded the 
case to determine if counsel's incompetence satisfied the Sykes requirement of show­
ing cause for the procedural default. Id. at 511. While this is not a case of inadvertent 
attorney waiver, as counsel was aware of the proper time to object, the court's 
analysis could be used to allow relief for a defendant who has lost rights because of 
the inadvertence of counsel which amounted to professional incompetence. 
93. 372 U.S. 391,435 (1963). 
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habeas petitions would be entertained despite the procedural de­
fault unless the default was a deliberate by-pass of the state proce­
dures. The Sykes Court was content to let procedural hurdles block 
a state prisoner's access to the federal habeas corpus forum. The 
Sykes view is that no petitions will be heard because of the exis­
tence of the procedural default unless a petitioner can show cause 
for the default and prejudice resulting from it. 
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Sykes that the defen­
dant had two interests to assert. One was to preserve his access to 
the federal courts despite the state procedural default. The other 
interest was to have some court hear his constitutional claims. 94 
The Sykes decision subordinates both of these interests to the goal 
of achieving finality in the local procedure. It not only accepts the 
denial of access to a state forum because of a violation of the state 
procedural rules, but also denies access to the federal habeas forum 
in many cases. 
In applying the cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, courts 
should attempt to accommodate the state prisoner who has lost 
rights through inadvertent attorney error. It is senseless and mis­
directed to deny habeas relief to such a defendant. It is 
senseless because unplanned and unintentional action of any 
kind is not subject to deterrence.... And it is a misdirected 
sanction because even if the penalization of incompetence or 
carelessness will encourage more thorough legal training and 
trial preparation, the habeas applicant, as opposed t~ his lawyer, 
hardly is the proper recipient of such a penalty. 95 
If the Sykes standard cannot provide relief for such a prisoner, then 
Justice Brennan's warning may become reality: 
If the standard adopted today is later construed to require that 
the simple mistakes of attorneys are to be treated as binding 
forfeitures, it would serve to subordinate the fundamental rights 
contained in our constitutional charter to inadvertent defaults of 
rules promulgated by state agencies and would essentially leave 
it to the States, through the enactment of procedure and the 
certification of the competence of local attorneys, to determine 
whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the access to the 
federal forum that is guaranteed him by Congress. 96 
John P. Letourneau 
94. 433 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
95. ld. at 113. 
96. ld. at 107 (footnote omitted). 
